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AMBIGUOUS LAW: THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN FOR JOB SECURITY 
IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
ELIZABETH SHI* 
 
This article argues that the current provisions which govern job security clauses in collective agreements are 
ambiguous and problematic.  Specifically, the ‘permitted matters’ law is unclear and inconsistently interpreted.  
Cases which concern almost identical job security clauses have received different treatments. The requirement to 
consider ‘the interests of employees and employers’ when arbitrating workplace determinations is also ambiguous.  
It is unclear whether employees’ job security is an interest that should be taken into account, and if so, how much 
weight should be placed on this consideration. This article argues that the law should be amended to address these 
ambiguities and to ensure more predictable and fairer outcomes. In contrast with the current provisions, the 
abolished rules ‘prohibited content’ were clearer and less ambiguous. 
I: INTRODUCTION 
It is the duty of a democratic parliament to enact statute which is clear, unambiguous, readily 
applicable and unproblematic so that it can be understood and followed without difficulty.1 As 
legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld sagaciously observed ‘[c]hameleon-hued words are a peril both 
to clear thought and to lucid expression.’2  
This article will argue that the right to bargain for job security in collective agreements in the 
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘Fair Work Act 2009’) is not clear, unambiguous, readily applicable and 
unproblematic. The law is unclear because it lacks detail and specificity, both in the provisions 
themselves and in the explanation of the law provided by the Parliament.   
Prior to the Fair Work Act 2009, the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 
2005 (Cth) (‘Work Choices’) prohibited specific matters from being included in employment 
agreement negotiations and outcomes. These ‘prohibited content’ rules included restrictions on 
the engagement of independent contractors and labour-hire workers and requirements relating to 
the conditions of their engagement.3 These restrictions and requirements were described as ‘job 
security clauses’. Under the ‘prohibited content’ rules, if a trade union chose to pursue claims for 
job security clauses, then the trade union would lose their right to take protected industrial 
action.4 If an employer chose to agree to job security clauses, it would face potential legal action.5 
The prohibited content laws were unambiguous and clear. The Fair Work Act 2009 has now 
abolished the ‘prohibited content’ rules, so job security clauses are no longer prohibited in 
                                                 
* Lecturer, Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT University. The Author would like to thank Associate Professor Jill 
Murray and the anonymous referees for their comments.   
1 Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Dartmouth, 1996) ch 6. 
2 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16, 28. 
3 Workplace Relations Regulation 2006 (Cth) regs 8.5(1)(h)–8.5(1)(i).  For a general discussion of agreement-making under Work 
Choices, see Christopher Jon Arup et al, ‘Assessing the Impact of Employment Legislation: The Coalition Government’s 
Labour Law Program 1997-2008 and the Challenge of Research’ (Research Report, Workplace and Corporate Law Research 
Group and Australian Centre for Research in Employment and Work, Monash University, 2009); Carolyn Sutherland, 
‘Making the ‘BOOT’ Fit: Reforms to Agreement-Making from Work Choices to Fair Work’ cited in Anthony Forsyth and 
Andrew Stewart (eds), Fair Work: The New Workplace Laws and the Work Choices Legacy (Federation Press, 2009) 99. 
4 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 365. 
5 Ibid ss 357, 365. 
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enterprise agreements certified under the Act. However, Parliament did not explain its intentions 
in regulating job security clauses.   
This article will argue that the precedents dealing with ‘permitted matters’ are unclear and 
inconsistent. The Explanatory Memorandum provides only limited guidance on which job 
security clauses fall into the definition of ‘permitted matters’.6    
Further, this article will argue that when making workplace determinations, the Fair Work 
Act 2009 requires the Fair Work Commission (‘FWC’) to take account of ‘the interests of 
employees and employers who will be covered by the determination’,7 but the meaning of this is 
ambiguous. The article will argue that it is unclear whether employees’ job security is an interest 
that should be taken into account, and if so, how much weight should be placed on this interest.  
The explanatory memorandum provides no guidance on this question either.8 The interpretations 
in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd9 (‘Qantas Workplace Determination’) 
will be discussed and used to illustrate the lack of clarity. 10 
Both ‘permitted matters’ and ‘interests of employees and employers’ will be considered in 
this article because both provisions have a direct impact on job security clauses. For example, if a 
job security clause falls within ‘permitted matters’, then it is permissible for employees to take 
industrial action to bargain for the clause. If the ‘interests of employees and employers’ includes 
job security interests then arguably the FWC must do more than just pay lip service to job 
security interests in deciding on job security clauses. 
It is conceded at the outset that Parliament did intend to grant FWC wide discretion.11  
Despite this, it will be argued that the jurisprudence on these provisions is inconsistent and 
unpredictable, and therefore further legislative clarification is necessary.         
II: THE DEFINITION OF JOB SECURITY AND JOB SECURITY CLAUSES 
At the core of this article is the concept of job security. The word ‘security’ is defined in the 
Macquarie Dictionary as free from or not exposed to danger, safe, free from care, and without 
anxiety.12 According to Standing, ‘security’ means a sense of being in control over one’s 
development and activities.13   
This article defines ‘job security’ as a state where an employee’s ‘reasonable and probable 
expectation of continued employment’ are being met; that is, the absence of fear of loss of 
employment. In the English case of Allen v Flood, Hawkin J explained this concept: 
The daily labourer, whose tested character for steadiness, honesty, and industry has induced his 
master, as a matter of course, through a long series of years, week by week to renew or continue 
                                                 
6 Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 110 [672]. 
7 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 275(c). 
8 Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 177 [1118]. 
9 [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012) [41]. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart have commented that the Rudd government’s aim was to avoid micro -regulation by 
conferring broad functions and appropriate discretion on Fair Work Commission. See Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, 
Labour Law (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2010) 48; Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 1 [4]. 
12 Arthur Delbridge et al (eds), The Macquarie Dictionary Federation Edition (1997) 1706. 
13 See Guy Standing, Global Labour Flexibility Seeking Distributive Justice (Basingstoke, 1999) 52. 
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his employment finds in this the foundation for his ‘reasonable and probable expectation’ that he 
may rely on continual employment in the future.14 
 
Generally speaking, when politicians, law makers, trade unions, and the media talk about ‘job 
security’, they are talking about meeting this expectation of continued employment.15 For the 
purposes of this article, a job security clause is defined as any intervention that restricts 
managerial decision making with regards to contracting out.16 Contracting out means hiring 
contractors who are not parties to a collective agreement to perform similar jobs to workers who 
are parties to a collective agreement.   
A job security clause includes any clause that restricts contracting out, for example, a clause 
which states that contracting out is only permitted if internal employees are not interested in the 
jobs. 
A job security clause also includes any clause that makes contracting out less attractive for 
an employer. For example, a clause which stipulates the employer must hire outside contractors 
on the same rates and conditions as the internal employees.  Such a clause is commonly referred 
to as a ‘site rates clause’.17 The intention of the site rates clause is to make it less attractive for the 
employer to use outside labour, and to increase job security for direct employees.   
Any clause that prohibits contracting out all together is also a job security clause. Such 
clauses are less common than the clauses which restrict or remove the incentive for contracting 
out.   
Any clause that prohibits or restricts forced redundancies as a result of contracting out is 
also a job security clause. 
By its very definition, job security clauses can be construed as an interference of managerial 
prerogatives. Once a job security clause is agreed to or arbitrated into an agreement, employers 
will not have complete freedom to do whatever they want in relation to hiring outside 
contractors. As will be discussed below, the view taken by FWC in the Qantas Workplace 
Determination was that key job security clauses were interfering with managerial prerogatives. 
 
                                                 
14 [1898] AC 1,  16. 
15 See Peter Reith and Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (Cth),  Job security in Australia 
(Office of the Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, 2000) ;   
Australian Council of Trade Unions, ‘Australian Workers Want Better Job Security, Not a Return to Work Choices -Style 
Policies’  (Media Release, 17 July 2011);  Amy Coderoy, ‘Job Preservation a Concern for Nation of Insecure Workers’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 September 2011; John Gennard, Job Security and Industrial Relations (Paris Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1979); Di Yerbury, ‘Redundancy: The Response of Australian Industrial Law’ 
(Working Paper No 82-002, Australian Graduate School of Management, 1982); Di Yerbury and Robert Clark ‘Redundancy 
and the Law: the Position in mid-1983’ (1983) 25 Journal of Industrial Relations 353; Stephen Deery ‘Trade Unions, 
Technological Change and Redundancy Protection in Australia’ (1982) 24(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 155. 
16 There are many cases involving job security clauses, both in the context of unions seeking to take protected industrial 
actions to obtain the clauses and in workplace determinations.  See for example, Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v 
Coca-Cola Amatil [2009] FWA 920 (3 November 2009); Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd v Australian Municipal, Administrative, 
Clerical Services Union  [2011] FWA 4506 (14 July 2011); Re Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia Pty Ltd, AWU, AMWU Certified 
Agreement (2005) 142 IR 289;  Australian Postal Corporation v Communicationa, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, 
Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2009]FWAFB 599 (12 October 2009). 
17 Site rates clause was the number one issue for the unions in the Qantas dispute.; see Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v 
Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012).  
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III: PROHIBITED CONTENT PROVISIONS IN THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 
Prior to the Fair Work Act 2009, Work Choices legislation prohibited an extensive list of matters 
from being included in employment agreements.  The majority of these prohibited content 
related to employee and union rights and benefits.18 With regards to job security clauses, reg 8.5 
of Workplace Relations Regulation 2006 (Cth) stipulated that following job security clauses were 
prohibited content: 
A term of a workplace agreement is prohibited content to the extent that it deals with the 
following: 
 …. 
(h) restrictions on the engagement of independent contractors and requirements relating to the 
conditions of their engagement; 
(i) restrictions on the engagement of labour hire workers, and requirements relating to the 
conditions of their engagement, imposed on an entity or person for whom the labour hire worker 
performs work under a contract with a labour hire agency 
 
The prohibitions applied to both employees and employers. If a trade union chose to pursue 
claims for job security clauses, then the trade union would lose their right to take protected 
industrial action.19 If an employer chose to agree to job security clauses, it would face potential 
legal action.20 The prohibited content restrictions led many unions to attempt to insert the 
prohibited terms into common law contracts or side agreements to operate alongside the 
statutory collective agreements.21 This side-stepping strategy was only successful if the employer 
was willing to agree to the side agreements.    
 
IV:  JOB SECURITY CLAUSES AND PERMITTED MATTERS PROVISIONS IN THE FAIR 
WORK ACT 
As will be discussed below, in the Qantas Workplace Determination the FWC rejected job 
security clauses because it was of the view that they interfered with managerial prerogatives. 
Work Choices legislation prohibited certain job security clauses from enterprise agreements.22 The 
prohibitions were clear-cut and unequivocal.  The Fair Work Act 2009 has now abolished the 
                                                 
18 Sutherland, above n 3, 99, 109. 
19 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 365. 
20 Ibid ss 357, 365. 
21 Andrew Stewart and Joellen Riley, ‘Working Around Work Choices: Collective Bargaining and the Common Law’ (2007) 31 
Melbourne University Law Review 903.  
22 Workplace Relations Regulation 2006 (Cth) regs 8.5(1)(h)-8.5(1)(i).  For a general discussion of agreement-making under Work 
Choices, see Sutherland, above n 3, 99. 
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‘prohibited content’ rules. Instead it confined the content of agreements to ‘permitted matters’23 
and deemed certain matters ‘unlawful terms’24.    
Section 172(1) stated that the enterprise agreements can be made about the following ‘permitted 
matters’:  
Matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer that will be covered by the 
agreement and that employer's employees who will be covered by the agreement; 
Matters pertaining to the relationship between the employer or employers, and the employee 
organisation or employee organisations, that will be covered by the agreement; 
Deductions from wages for any purpose authorised by an employee who will be covered by the 
agreement; 
How the agreement will operate. 
 
Employers have frequently argued that the job security clauses were not matters pertaining to the 
relationship between an employer or employer and employees and therefore were not permitted 
matters.  For example it has been argued that the site rates clause was not a matter pertaining to 
the relationship between an employer and employees, because the clause did not govern the 
wages and conditions of employees.25 It only governed the wages and conditions of contractors.26  
What, then, was the meaning of ‘matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer 
or employer and employees’ (‘matters pertaining’)? The Explanatory Memoranda answered this 
question only to some extent by providing that certain clauses were not matters pertaining, while 
certain other clauses were matters pertaining. The guidance provided was only partial and left 
many grey areas. 
The Explanatory Memoranda stated that clauses that contain a general prohibition on the 
employer engaging labour hire employees or contractor were not matters pertaining to the 
relationship between an employer and employees, nor were clauses that contain a general 
prohibition on the employer employing casual employees.27   
Further, the explanatory memorandum stated: 
 
It is intended that the following terms would be within the scope of permitted matters for 
the purpose of paragraph 172(1)(a):  … Terms relating to conditions or requirements about 
employing casual employees or engaging labour hire or contractors if those terms sufficiently 
relate to employees’ job security – e.g. a term which provided that contractors must not be 
engaged on terms and conditions that would undercut the enterprise agreement.28  
 
It remains unclear what constitutes something which ‘sufficiently related to’ employees’ job 
security, other than the example given. A term which provided that contractors must not be 
                                                 
23  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 172(1). 
24 Ibid s 194;  Unlawful Content includes discriminatory terms, objectionable terms, unfair termination term,  a term 
modifying unfair dismissal protection, a term inconsistent to industrial action laws, a term that interferes right of entry l aws, a 
term which modifies State or Territory OHS rights. 
25 A site rates clause is a clause which stipulates the employer must hire outside contractors on the same rates and conditions 
as the internal employees; see Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd (2012) FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012).  
26 Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Coca-Cola Amatil [2009] FWA 920 (3 November 2009); Flinders Operating Services Pty 
Ltd v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical Services Union [2011] FWA 4506 (14 July 2011). 
27  Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 108 [673].  
28 Ibid 108 [672], emphasis added.  
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engaged on terms and conditions that would undercut the enterprise agreement is basically a site 
rates clause. Therefore explanatory memorandum stipulates that a site rates clause was a 
‘permitted matter’. Accordingly, site rates clause had been accepted as permitted content in a 
number of cases, including Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union v Coca-Cola Amatil29 and 
Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical Services Union  
(Flinders).30 
Whilst the explanatory memorandum provided guidance on specific clauses such as site 
rates clauses, it did not provide guidance on many other types of job security clauses. Whilst it is 
true that there is indeed a substantial jurisprudence about matters pertaining,31 many parts of this 
jurisprudence are uncertain, incoherent and inconsistent.32 The following section demonstrates 
the uncertain, incoherent and inconsistent case law concerning job security clauses.  
 
V: INCONSISTENCIES IN CASES INTERPRETING ‘PERMITTED MATTERS’ 
As discussed above, many parts of the jurisprudence of ‘permitted matters’ are uncertain, 
incoherent and inconsistent. Cases which concern almost identical job security clauses have often 
received very different treatments in different cases. The following two cases illustrate the 
inconsistencies.33 
In Flinders 34 , the Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical and Services Union wanted to 
insert the following clauses which limited the circumstances in which supplementary labour may 
be used: 
The Company may from time to time use supplementary labour for the absence of direct 
employees on extended leave, temporary vacancies and peak workloads in areas normally staffed by 
direct employees. 
Direct employees will be given the option of working overtime and/or being called back to work 
before external personnel are engaged.35     
                                                 
29 [2009] FWA 920 (3 November 2009). 
30 Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd v Australian Municipal, Adminitsrative, Clerical Services Union  [2011] FWA 4506 (14 July 2011).   
31 Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 107 [670].  The law of ‘matters pertaining to the relationship between 
an employer or employers and employees’ is of long standing.  Similar provisions had existed in both the Industrial Relations 
Act 1988 (Cth) and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) before 27 March 2006.  After 27 March 2006, a clause that was not 
about such matters was prohibited content. 
32 Andrew Stewart made these observations in 2009. See ‘FWA Tackles Content Rules on Contracting and Labour Hire’, 
Workplace Express, 5 November 2009 <www.workplaceexpress.com.au>. For discussions of matters pertaining cases and 
legislation, see also Esther Stern, ‘Industrial Disputes and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Industrial Tribunal: An Analysis of 
Recent Developments’ (1990) 3 Australian Journal of Labour Law 130; J T Ludeke, ‘Whatever Happened to the Prerogatives of 
Management?’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 11; Marilyn Pittard, ‘Agreement Straying Beyond Employment Matters: The 
Impact of the Agreement Validation Matters Legislation’ (2005) 18 Australian Journal of Labour Law 71. 
33 Both of these cases concerned the employees’ right to take protected industrial action.  It is well-settled case law that industrial 
action may not be taken in support of claims which are not permitted content in an agreement.   This doctrine arose out of the 
High Court decision of Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union and Others (2004) 221 CLR 309 and this 
case was confirmed as good law in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Fair Work Act 2009.   In addition, s 409 of Fair Work 
Act 2009 also prevents employees and their bargaining representatives from organising or taking protected industrial action if 
their claims are not for permitted matters. 
34 [2001] FWA4506 (14 July 2011). 
35 Ibid 80. 
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Under these clauses, the employer could not use supplementary labour in circumstances other 
than absence, temporary vacancies or peak workloads, nor could it use supplementary labour 
without offering overtime or offering calling back direct employees first. The employer, Alinda 
Energy, refused to agree to these two clauses, as well as to other job security clauses proposed.36  
The union then gave the employer formal notice to take industrial action. The employer then 
applied to FWC in order to stop the industrial action, arguing, among other things, that the 
above clauses were not permitted matters because they did not pertain to the relationship 
between the employer and employees.37 The employer argued that the clauses impermissibly 
restricted the employer’s ability to engage outside labour to meet its operational needs. 
Deputy President Bartel rejected the employer’s argument. DP Bartel held that the clauses 
were permitted matters, because while these provisions may be construed as a partial restriction 
on the use of external employees, the overall intent is to maximise permanent employment.38  DP 
Bartel compared these clauses with a clause in Re Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia Pty Ltd, 
AWU, AMWU Certified Agreement (‘Schefenacker’) which stipulated that the maximum level of 
labour hire workers to be 20% of total employees.39 In Schefenacker, the Full Bench ruled a 20% 
cap was a permitted matter.40  DP Bartel concluded that a 20% cap was arguably more restrictive 
than the clauses in Flinders, and therefore the clauses in Flinders should be construed as permitted 
matters. 
The reasoning in Flinders appears quite logical.  However a very similar clause was held not 
to be permitted content in the case of Australian Postal Corporation v Communicationa, Electrical, 
Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia 41 (‘Australian Postal 
Corporation’).  
In Australian Postal Corporation, the trade union attempted to bargain for the following clause: 
‘Australia Post must advertise every position internally and to only contract out a position if it is 
not wanted by an Australia Post employee.’42    
This clause was very similar to the clauses in Flinders which required the employer to offer 
overtime to existing employees, and to only hire from outside in circumstances of extended 
leave, peak vacancy and extended workloads.  
Australia Post argued that this clause was not a permitted matter, as it did not pertain to the 
relationship between the employer and employees.43 The Full Bench, consisting of Senior Deputy 
President Acton, Deputy President Hamilton and Commissioner Blair, agreed with Australia 
Post.44 The Full Bench cited French J’s judgment in Wesfarmers Premier Coal Ltd v Automotive, Food, 
Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (No 2)45 (‘Wesfarmers’).  In that case, French J 
found that ‘provisions restricting or qualifying the employer’s right to use independent 
contractors’ are not matters pertaining to the employment relationship. 
                                                 
36 Ibid 60.  
37 Ibid 60. 
38 Ibid 80. 
39 Re Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia Pty Ltd, AWU, AMWU Certified Agreement  (2005) 142 IR 289.  
40 Ibid [73]. 
41 [2009] FWAFB 599 (12 October 2009). 
42 Ibid [49]. 
43 Ibid [33]. 
44 Ibid [62]. 
45 [2004] FCA 1737 (23 December 2004). 
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Surprisingly, the Full Bench made absolutely no mention of that fact the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Fair Work Act 2009 expressly stated that clauses relating to conditions or 
requirements about employing casual employees or engaging labour hire or contractors are 
matters pertaining to the relationship between an employer and employees, if those clauses 
sufficiently relate to employees’ job security.46  The Full Bench failed to give any consideration to 
the question of whether the clause in question fitted into this category. Instead, the Full Bench 
relied heavily on the precedent set in Wesfarmers. Wesfarmers might be relevant but it was a case 
decided under the previous legislation, not the Fair Work Act 2009.   
VI: UNCLEAR PROVISION OF ‘THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES’ 
The previous section has shown that parts of the jurisprudence of ‘permitted matters’ are unclear 
and inconsistent. This section will argue that the requirement to take into account ‘the interests 
of employers and employees’ when deciding on workplace determinations is also unclear. In 
particular, it is unclear whether employees’ job security is an interest that should be taken into 
account, and if so, how much weight should be placed on this interest. The explanatory 
memorandum does not provide guidance on this question.47       
It must be pointed out that the context in which workplace determinations are made are 
different from the cases where appropriate parameters of workplace bargaining are determined, 
such as Flinders and Australian Postal Corporation discussed in section V of this article. There has 
been the longstanding legal principle in workplace determinations that any substantial 
interference with managerial prerogatives requires careful consideration.48    
Despite this longstanding legal principle, s 275(c) provides that FWC must take into account 
interest of both employers and employees. However, the precise meaning of ‘the interests of 
employers and employees’ was not defined in the explanatory memoranda.49 Therefore the courts 
and FWC were given wide discretion in the interpretation. 
In addition, the courts and FWC must also consider the following matters in deciding which 
terms to include in a workplace determination (broadly referred to as ‘merit grounds’): 
Section 275 
(d) the public interest; 
(e) how productivity might be improved in the enterprise or enterprises concerned; 
(f) the extent to which the conduct of the bargaining representatives was reasonable; 
(g) the extent to which the bargaining representatives have complied with the good faith bargaining 
requirements; 
(h) incentives to continue bargaining at a later time. 
                                                 
46 Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 108 [672].   
47 Ibid 177 [1118]. 
48 Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 117, 136-7. 
49 Explanatory Memoranda, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 177 [1118]. 
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VII: ‘INTERESTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES’ IN THE QANTAS WORKPLACE 
DETERMINATION 
In the Qantas Workplace Determination,50 the Full Bench of FWC had to apply s 275 and take 
account of the merit grounds in reaching its conclusion. As argued below, although the Full 
Bench paid lip service to employees’ ‘legitimate concerns as to their job security’,51 it made a 
determination which effectively ignored these concerns.    
The Transport Workers’ Union failed to persuade the Full Bench on two major job security 
clauses: the site rates clause and the 20% cap clause.  Both of these major job security clauses 
had an immediate effect on the labour costs incurred by Qantas. The clauses the Union did 
persuade the Full Bench to accept had no effect on the labour costs incurred by Qantas:  the no 
forced redundancies clause and the consultation and paid time off for Union representatives.   
A: Site Rates Clause 
The Transport Workers’ Union sought a site rates clause, which stipulated that if, after 
consultation, Qantas decides to use supplementary labour and/or outsider hire, Qantas will 
ensure that they will receive the same rates and conditions as the direct employees.52 During the 
industrial dispute, the union told Qantas and the public that the site rates clause was the ‘number 
one issue’ for its members.53 The union argued that it wanted the site rates clause in place 
because it wanted to ensure that the workplace determination will not be undermined or avoided 
by contracting out and the engagement of contractors.54 It wanted to increase job security for the 
direct employees and to make contracting out less attractive for Qantas.    
Qantas objected to this clause on merit grounds. Qantas argued that it was already paying its 
contractors lower rates than its direct employees. Qantas also argued that such a clause was 
unprecedented both in Qantas and in the airline industry, interfered in the ‘heartland of 
managerial discretion’, and will lead to an increase in costs, undermine competitiveness, and was 
‘inimical to improving productivity’.55  
The Full Bench viewed the site rates clause as a clause which dealt with contractors and 
labour hire employees, and not with Qantas’s direct employees. Because the determination was 
for Qantas and Qantas’s direct employees, the Full Bench held that it was inappropriate for the 
Workplace Determination to directly or indirectly govern the terms and conditions of 
                                                 
50 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) pts 2-5 describes the circumstances in which FWA has the power to make Workplace 
Determinations. These circumstances include bargaining related workplace determinations, low-paid workplace 
determinations and industrial action related workplace determinations.  Workplace determination must occur after a 
termination of industrial dispute instrument has been made on the grounds either of significant economic harm to the 
negotiating parties or of actual or threatened harm to the broader economy or community and a post -industrial action 
negotiation period expires.  This was the trigger for the FWA arbitration in Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas 
Airways Ltd [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012) [41].   
51 Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012) [41]. 
52 Ibid [63]. 
53 See ‘Site Rates Key to Qantas Dispute: TWU’, Workplace Express, 22 March 2012 <www.workplaceexpress.com.au>; TWU’s 
priorities are also stated in several media releases online, March 2012, see TWU website <www.twu.com.au>.    
54  Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012) [64]. 
55 Ibid [65].  
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employment of employees not covered by it.56 The Full Bench also observed that the use of 
contractors and labour hire employees was a widespread operational strategy in the airline 
industry and it allowed airlines to achieve operational flexibility and reduce costs.57 Granting the 
site rate clause would overturn the current Qantas approach in using contractors and lead to 
immediate and significant increases in labour costs.58 It also took into account Qantas’s strong 
opposition and its expressed need to reduce costs in a difficult market environment. It 
concluded the site rates failed on the grounds of merit and because of its negative impact on 
efficiency and productivity.59 
What was noticeably missing in the Full Bench’s reasoning was any genuine considerations 
of job security. As discussed above, s 275(c) required the Full Bench to take into account the 
interests of employers and employees.60 The Full Bench paid lip service to job security by 
acknowledging that ‘in the competitive environment and in the face of organisational restructure, 
the employees also have legitimate concerns as to their job security’ and that ‘ultimately it is in 
the interests of both Qantas and its employees that Qantas operates a viable and competitive 
business and is able to retain, attract and reward skilled and motivated employees.’61 However, 
the Full Bench’s actual reasoning on the site rates clause seemed to ignore employees’ legitimate 
concerns as to their job security. The site rates clause was intended to bolster the employees’ job 
security.  In its reasons for rejecting the site rates clause, the Full Bench gave priority to Qantas’s 
need to reduce costs over considerations of job security.   
Further, the Full Bench’s reasoning favoured the ‘current Qantas approach’ and what is 
‘widespread’ in the airline industry. Whilst these considerations were certainly relevant, the Full 
Bench did not explain why these considerations should be given more weight than considerations 
of job security. 
B: 20% Cap on Supplementary labour and outside hire 
In addition to the sites rates clause, another job security clause the union wanted was a clause 
which required the total number of supplementary labour and outside hire to be no more than 
20% of the total number of directly hired employees at any given time.62   
This clause, in conjunction with the site rates clause was intended to limit the use of 
supplementary labour. TWU opposed the extent to which Qantas engaged labour hire and 
supplementary employees and argued that Qantas should not be permitted to allow the number 
of direct Qantas employees to dwindle by attrition.63     
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 The Full Bench also cited Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Indistries Union v Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd  
(Australian Indistrial Relations Commission, Q4464, C2758, 983/98, 11 August 1998, in holding that the ‘interests of employers 
and employees’ in s 275(c ) calls for an appropriate balance between the legitimate expectations of the employers and employees. 
61 Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012) [41]. 
62 Ibid [78]. A percentage cap clause has been accepted by previous courts and tribunals as ‘permitted matter’ and a ‘matter 
pertaining to relationship of employers and employees’.  See for example, Re Schefenacker Vision Systems Australia Pty Ltd, 
AWU, AMWU Certified Agreement (2005) 142 IR 289. 
63 Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] FWAFB 6612 (8 August 2012) [82]. 
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Qantas contended that this clause should fail on both merit grounds and on jurisdictional 
grounds. It argued that a percentage cap did not deal with a permitted matter and thus failed on 
jurisdictional grounds.64 It also argued against the percentage cap on merit grounds:  that it had 
no precedence within Qantas or the airline industry, it will increase costs and reduce flexibility 
and did not enhance productivity.65  
The Full Bench held that this claim failed on merit.66  It ruled that using contractors and 
outside hire has been a long standing practice and it has not been shown that current Qantas 
employees have been adversely affected by this practice.67 It went on say: 
To interfere with management’s decisions on such a matter would require clear and strong 
evidence of unfairness. No such case has been established with respect to current employees or 
otherwise. In the light of this conclusion it is not necessary that we determine whether there is 
jurisdiction to insert the clause. Even if there is jurisdiction to grant such a clause we would dismiss 
it on the grounds of merit.68 
 
What the Full Bench meant by ‘clear and strong evidence of unfairness’ was ambiguous.  The 
Full Bench did not explain why the fact full time employees were dwindling by attrition was not 
‘evidence of unfairness’. A higher and higher percentage of Qantas workers were becoming 
contractors engaged on worse terms than the direct employees. This was detrimental to the 
employees’ interests.     
Similar to its reasoning on the site rates clause, the Full Bench’s reasoning on the 20% cap 
clause again effectively ignored employees’ legitimate concerns. It again favoured the ‘current 
Qantas approach’ and what was ‘widespread’ in the airline industry over the interests of the 
employees.   
C: No forced redundancies clause 
Unlike the previous two clauses, TWU was able to persuade the Full Bench on a clause that 
stated that there will be no compulsory redundancies as a consequence of the utilisation of 
supplementary labour and outside hire.69   
Qantas opposed the insertion of the clause into the collective agreement but did agree to 
issue a side letter with slightly altered wording.70 The Full Bench ruled that the commitment 
Qantas was willing to give should be included into the collective agreement.71 The Full Bench 
reasoned that although there has been no history of compulsory redundancies as a result of 
hiring contractors and no plans for this to occur in the near future, the extensive use of 
contractors did raise legitimate concerns about the impact of these changes on job security.72 
                                                 
64 Ibid [80]. 
65 Ibid [81]. 
66 Ibid [82]. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid [74]. 
70 Ibid [76]. 
71 Ibid [77]. 
72 Ibid. 
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The difference between this clause and the two rejected clauses listed above seems to be the 
fact there would be no immediate increase in labour cost for Qantas in order to obey this clause.  
In addition, Qantas had already agreed to the clause anyway in a side letter.   
D: Consultation and Paid Time Off for Representatives 
The union also succeeded in obtaining a clause which required Qantas to weigh up all alternative 
options before making arrangements to contract out, as well as a comprehensive consultation 
process and a reasonable time frame for consideration with all Qantas employees affected by 
such an option.73 It also required Qantas to provide reasonable resources and paid time off for 
union nominees and union members to attend meetings to respond to the business case for 
contracting out and prepare specific in-house bids.74   
Once again, this clause did not lead to an immediate increase in costs for the employer, 
because Qantas had provided resources and paid time off in the past. There would be no change 
to existing practice. 
E: FWC’s Consideration of ‘Interests of Employers and Employees’ in Qantas 
The Full Bench of FWC rejected the site rates clause and the 20% cap clause, but accepted the 
no forced redundancies clause and the consultation and time off clause. The key difference 
between them was the fact that the site rates clause and the 20% cap clause led to a direct and 
immediate increase in the cost of labour for Qantas and departed from existing practice.   
By giving such weighty consideration to the cost of labour and existing practice, the Full 
Bench effectively ignored the employees’ interests in ensuring job security. The site rates clause 
and 20% cap clause would have increased the employees’ job security.   
As discussed in Part VI above, FWC had broad discretion to interpret the merit grounds 
section.75 It chose to interpret the section in a way which did not give any weight to the 
employees’ interests in ensuring job security. 
It is unclear how much later decisions will rely on the Qantas Workplace Determination, 
because the Full Bench did emphasise the specific difficulties faced by the aviation industry.76  
This might mean that if a future dispute arose in an industry which was more robust and less 
affected by the economic downturn than the aviation industry, the outcome could be more 
favourable for job security.77   
 
                                                 
73 Ibid [72]. 
74 Ibid. 
75 The broad discretion given to FWA was not unique to the merit grounds section.  See Creighton and Stewart, above n 11, 
48. 
76 Ibid 95. 
77 Other commentators have also commented on the Qantas dispute and the status of the aviation industry.   See Anthony 
Forsyth and Andrew Stewart, ‘Of Kamikazes and Mad Men: the Fallout from the Qantas Industrial Dispute’ (2013) 36 
Melbourne University Law Review 785, 808; Joellen Riley, ‘A Safe Touch-Down for Qantas?’ (2012) 25 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 76; Sue Bussel and John Farrow, ‘Continuity and Change: The Fair Work Act in Aviation’ (2011) 53 Journal of Industrial 
Relations 392. 
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VIII: CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that ‘permitted matters’ law is unclear and inconsistently interpreted.  
Cases which concern almost identical job security clauses have received different treatments.  
This article has also argued that the ‘interests of employers and employees’ is not clearly 
defined, thus granting FWC very wide discretion when arbitrating job security clauses in 
workplace determinations.    
Certainly, granting FWC a very wide discretion was a conscious decision by Parliament, but 
the lack of clarity in the legislation, coupled with the abolition of ‘prohibited content’ has 
resulted in unpredictable legal outcomes for Australian employers and employees.  Historically 
the tribunal has been reluctant to arbitrate outcomes with that interfere with managerial 
prerogatives. By their very nature, all job security clauses could be construed as interfering with 
managerial prerogatives, so why not prohibit job security clauses altogether in workplace 
determinations? This would be a much clearer approach. The previous law of ‘prohibited 
content’ did exactly that. It would save a lot of time and resources for employees and trade 
unions who are attempting to argue for job security clauses to be included into a workplace 
determination and lead to a more efficient legal process.   
It is time for Parliament to follow the advice given by legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld and 
take action to clarify this area of law.78    
 
 
                                                 
78 Hohfeld, above n 2, 28. 
